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Abstract
We discuss and compare two methods of investigations for the asymptotic regime of
stochastic differential games with a finite number of players as the number of players
tends to the infinity. These two methods differ in the order in which optimization and
passage to the limit are performed. When optimizing first, the asymptotic problem is
usually referred to as a mean-field game. Otherwise, it reads as an optimization problem
over controlled dynamics of McKean-Vlasov type. Both problems lead to the analysis of
forward-backward stochastic differential equations, the coefficients of which depend on
the marginal distributions of the solutions. We explain the difference between the nature
and solutions to the two approaches by investigating the corresponding forward-backward
systems. General results are stated and specific examples are treated, especially when
cost functionals are of linear-quadratic type.
1 Introduction
The problem studied in this paper concerns stochastic differential games with a large num-
ber of players. We compare two methods of investigation which offer, in the asymptotic
regime when the number of players tends to infinity, a structure which is simple enough to
be amenable to actual solutions, both from the theoretical and numerical points of view.
In order to derive tractable solutions, we assume that all the players are similar in their
behavior, and that each individual on his own, can hardly influence the outcome of the game.
We further strengthen the symmetry of the problem by assuming that the interaction between
the players is of mean field type in the sense that whenever an individual player has to make
a decision, he or she sees only averages of functions of the private states of the other players.
These games are symmetric in the sense that all the players are statistically identical, but
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they are not anonymous1 (see for example [14]) or with weak interaction in the sense of [13].
In the large game limit, a given player should feel the presence of the other players through
the statistical distribution of the private states of the other players, and should determine his
optimal strategy by optimizing his appropriately modified objective criterion taking the limit
N → ∞ into account. The search for an approximate Nash equilibrium of the game in this
asymptotic regime is dictated by the Mean Field Game (MFG for short) proposition of Lasry
and Lions. See for example [15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 11].
Without the optimization part, and when all the players use the same distributed feed-
back strategy as suggested by the symmetry of the set-up, the large population regime is
reminiscent of Mark Kac’s propagation of chaos theory put on rigorous mathematical ground
by McKean and known under the name of McKean–Vlasov (MKV for short) theory. See
for example Sznitman’s beautiful mathematical treatment [22]. Indeed, according to these
works, one expects that, in the limit N → ∞, the private states of the individual players
evolve independently of each other, each of them satisfying a specific stochastic differential
equation with coefficients depending upon the statistical distribution of the private state in
question. Having each player optimize his own objective function under the constraints of this
new private state dynamics amounts to the stochastic control of McKean–Vlasov dynamics,
mathematical problem not understood in general. See nevertheless [1] for an attempt in this
direction. Coming back to our original problem we may wonder if the optimization over the
feedback strategies in this new control problem leads to one form of approximate equilibrium
for the original N player game. In any case, if such a problem can be solved, the issue is to
understand how an optimal feedback strategy for such a problem compares with the result of
the MFG analysis.
The main thrust of this paper is to investigate the similarities and the differences between
the MFG approach to stochastic games with mean field interactions, and the search for an
optimal strategy for controlled McKean–Vlasov stochastic differential equations. In Section
2, we give a pedagogical introduction to these two very related (and sometimes confused)
problems with the specific goal to explain the differences between their nature and solutions; in
Section 6, we also provide the reader with a short guide for tackling these problems within the
framework of Forward–Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (FBSDEs) of the McKean–
Vlasov type.
The remaining part of the paper is devoted to the discussion of special classes of models
for which we can address the existence issue and compare the solutions of the two problems
explicitly. We give special attention to Linear Quadratic (LQ) stochastic games because of
their tractability. Indeed, in this case, the mean field character of the interaction is of a
very simple nature as it involves only the empirical mean and the empirical variance of the
individual states, and they both enter the coefficients linearly. For these models, we implement
the MFG approach and analyze the optimal control of MKV dynamics in Sections 3 and 42
respectively. While bearing some similarity to the contents of this section, the results of [2]
on some linear quadratic MFGs are different in the sense that they concern some infinite
horizon stationary cases without any attempt to compare the results of the MFG approach
1In the anonymous framework, dynamics are given for the statistical distribution of the population so that
the private dynamics of the players are not explicit.
2After completion of this work, we were made aware of the appearance on the web of a very recent technical
report by A. Bensoussan, K. C. J. Sung, S. C. P. Yam, and S. P. Yung entitled Linear Quadratic Mean Field
Games. In this independent work, the authors present a study of linear quadratic mean field games in relation
to the control of McKean-Vlasov dynamics very much in the spirit of what we do in Section 3 and Section 4.
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to the control of the corresponding McKean–Vlasov dynamics. We provide more explicit
examples in Section 5, including a simple example of CO2 emissions regulation which serves
as motivation for models where the interaction is of mean field type and appears only in the
terminal cost.
While the MFG approach does not ask for the solution of stochastic equations of the
McKean–Vlasov type at first, the required fixed point argument identifies one of these so-
lutions of standard optimal control problems as the de facto solution of an FBSDE of the
McKean–Vlasov type as the marginal distributions of the solution appear in the coefficients
of the equation. Since the McKean–Vlasov nature of these FBSDEs is rather trivial in the
case of LQ mean field games, we devote Section 6 to a discussion of the construction of solu-
tions to these new classes of FBSDEs which, as far as we know, have not been studied in the
literature.
2 Stochastic Differential Game with Mean Field Interactions
We consider a class of stochastic differential games where the interaction between the players
is given in terms of functions of average characteristics of the private states and actions of
the individual players, hence their name Mean Field Games. In our formulation, the state of
the system (which is controlled by the actions of the individual players) is given at each time
t by a vector Xt = (X
1
t , · · · , XNt ) whose N components Xit can be interpreted as the private
states of the individual players. A typical example capturing the kind of symmetry which we
would like to include is given by models in which the dynamics of the private states are given
by coupled stochastic differential equations of the form
dXit =
1
N
N∑
j=1
b˜(t,Xit , X
j
t , α
i
t)dt+ σdW
i
t , (1)
where b˜ is a function of time, the values of two private states, and the control of one player, and
((W i)t≥0)1≤i≤N are independent Wiener processes. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that
each process (Xit)0≤t≤T is univariate. Otherwise, the notations become more involved while
the results remain essentially the same. The present discussion can accommodate models
where the volatility σ is a function with the same structure as b˜. We refrain from considering
this level of generality to keep the notations to a reasonable level. We use the notation
αt = (α
1
t , · · · , αNt ) for the players strategies. Notice that the dynamics (1) can be rewritten
in the form:
dXit = b(t,X
i
t , µ
N
t , α
i
t)dt+ σdW
i
t , (2)
if the function b of time, a private state, a probability distribution on private states, and a
control, is defined by
b(t, x, µ, α) =
∫
R
b˜(t, x, x′, α) dµ(x′) (3)
and the measure µNt is defined as the empirical distribution of the private states, i.e.
µNt =
1
N
N∑
j=1
δ
Xjt
. (4)
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Interactions given by functions of the form (3) will be called linear or of order 1. We could
imagine that the drift of (1) giving the interaction between the private states is of the form
1
N2
N∑
j,k=1
b˜(t,Xit , X
j
t , X
k
t , α
i
t)
which could be rewritten, still with µ = µNt , in the form
b(t, x, µ, α) =
∫
R
b˜(t, x, x′, x′′, α) dµ(x′)dµ(x′′). (5)
Interactions of this form will be called quadratic or of order 2. Clearly, one can extend this
definition to interactions of all orders, and more generally, we will say that the interaction
is fully nonlinear if it is given by a drift of the form b(t,Xit , µ
N
t , αt) for a general function b
defined on [0, T ]×R×P1(R)×A where P1(R) denotes the set of probability measures on the
real line and A the space in which, at each time t ∈ [0, T ], the controls can be chosen by the
individual players. In general, we say that the game involves interactions of the mean field
type if the coefficients of the stochastic differential equation giving the dynamics of a private
state depend upon the other private states exclusively through the empirical distribution of
these private states – in other words if the interaction is fully nonlinear in the sense just
defined – and if the running and terminal cost functions have the same structure.
Remark 1. As in the case of several of the models discussed later on, the dependence upon
the empirical distribution µNt of the private states can degenerate to a dependence upon some
moments of this distribution. To be more specific, we can have
b(t, x, µ, α) = b˜(t, x, 〈ϕ, µ〉, α) (6)
for some scalar function ϕ of the private states, where we use the duality notation 〈ϕ, µ〉 =∫
R ϕ(x
′)dµ(x′) for the integral of a function with respect to a measure. In such a case, we
shall say that the interaction is scalar.
To summarize the problem at hand, the game consists in minimizing simultaneously costs
of the form
J i(α) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xit , µ
N
t , α
i
t)dt+ g(XT , µ
N
T )
]
, i = 1, · · · , N, (7)
under constraints of the form
dXit = b(t,X
i
t , µ
N
t , α
i
t)dt+ σdW
i
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (8)
where the W i are independent standard Wiener processes. (In the whole paper, we use the
underlined notation Z to denote a stochastic (Zt)t∈I indexed by time t in some interval I.)
Note that for symmetry reasons, we choose the running and terminal cost functions f and g
to be the same for all the players. Our goal is to search for equilibriums of such a stochastic
differential game.
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2.1 Optimization Problems for Individual Players
Given that the problem is intractable in most cases (see nevertheless the discussion of the
linear quadratic case in Sections 3 and 4 and the description of general results toward a
systematic treatment in Section 6), we try to identify realistic models for which approximate
equilibriums and optimal strategies can be identified and computed.
For the sake of definiteness, we restrict ourselves to equilibriums given by Markovian
strategies in closed loop feedback form
αt = (φ
1(t,Xt), · · · , φN (t,Xt)), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
for some deterministic functions φ1, · · · , φN of time and the state of the system. Further, we
assume that the strategies are of distributed type in the sense that the function φi giving the
strategy of player i depends upon the state Xt of the system only through the private state
Xit of player i. In other words, we request that:
αit = φ
i(t,Xit), i = 1, · · · , N.
Moreover, given the symmetry of the set-up, we restrict our search for equilibriums to situa-
tions in which all the players use the same feedback strategy function, i.e.
φ1(t, · ) = · · · = φN (t, · ) = φ(t, · ), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
for some common deterministic function φ. The search for an equilibrium with a fixed finite
number of players involves optimization, and the exact form of the optimization depends
upon the notion of equilibrium we are interested in. In any case, we hope that, in the large
game regime (i.e. when we let the number of players go to ∞), some of the features of the
problem will be streamlined and the optimization, if feasible, will provide a way to construct
approximate equilibriums for the game with a finite (though large) number of players. We
show that, depending upon the nature of the equilibrium we are aiming for, the effective
problem appearing in the limit can be of one form or another.
2.2 Search for Nash Equilibriums: Optimizing First
If we search for a Nash equilibrium when the number N of players is fixed, each player i
assumes that the other players have already chosen their strategies, say α1∗t = φ1∗(t,X1t ), · · ·
, αi−1∗ = φi−1∗(t,Xi−1t ), α
i+1∗
t = φ
i+1∗(t,Xi+1t ), · · · , αN∗t = φN∗(t,XNt ), and under this
assumption, solves the optimization problem:
φi∗ = arg min
φ
E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xit , µ
N
t , φ(t,X
i
t))dt+ g(X
i
T , µ
N
T )
]
, (9)
when the dynamics of his own private state is controlled by the feedback control αit = φ(t,X
i
t)
while the dynamics of the private states of the other players are controlled by the feedbacks
αjt = φ
j∗(t,Xjt ) for j = 1, · · · , i− 1, i+ 1, · · · , N . So when writing an equation for a critical
point (typically a first order condition), we apply an infinitesimal perturbation to φ∗ without
perturbing any of the other φj∗ for j 6= i, and look for conditions under which this deviation
for player i does not make him better off when the other players do not deviate from the
strategies they use. Also, recall that we are willing to restrict ourselves to optimal strategies
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of the form φ1∗ = φ2∗ = · · · = φN∗ because of our symmetry assumption. As a result of this
exchangeability property of the system, even though a perturbation of φ∗ could in principle
affect the dynamics of all the private states by changing the empirical distribution of these
private states, however, especially when the number of players N is large, a form of the law of
large numbers should make this empirical measure µNt quite insensitive to small perturbations
of φ∗. So for all practical purposes, the optimization problem (9) can be solved as (or at least
its solution can be approximated by) a standard stochastic control problem once the family
(µNt )0≤t≤T of probability measures is fixed.
So in this approach, the search for an approximate Nash equilibrium is based on the
following strategy: first one fixes a family (µt)0≤t≤T of probability measures, next, one solves
the standard stochastic control problem (parameterized by the choice of the family (µt)0≤t≤T ):
φ∗ = arg min
φ
E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xt, µt, φ(t,Xt))dt+ g(XT , µT )
]
(10)
subject to the dynamic constraint
dXt = b(t,Xt, µt, φ(t,Xt))dt+ σdW˜t, (11)
for some Wiener process (W˜t)0≤t≤T . Once this standard stochastic control problem is solved,
the remaining issue is the choice of the flow (µt)0≤t≤T of probability measures. This is where
the limit N →∞ comes to the rescue. Indeed, the asymptotic independence and the form of
law of large numbers provided by the theory of propagation of chaos (see for example [22]) tell
us that, in the limit N → ∞, the empirical measure µNt should coincide with the statistical
distribution of Xt. So, once an optimum φ
∗ is found for each choice of the family (µt)0≤t≤T ,
then the family of measures is determined (typically by a fixed point argument) so that, at
each time t, the statistical distribution of the solution Xt of (11) is exactly µt.
The role of the limit N →∞ (large number of players) is to guarantee the stability of the
empirical measure µNt when a single player perturbs his strategy while the other players keep
theirs unchanged, and the fact that this stable distribution has to be the common statistical
distribution of all the private states Xit . Performing the optimization over φ when the family
(µt)0≤t≤T of probability measures is kept fixed is the proper way to implement the notion of
Nash equilibrium whereby each player is not better off if he deviates from his strategy while
all the other players keep theirs untouched, as implied by the lack of change in (µt)0≤t≤T and
hence (µNt )0≤t≤T .
From a mathematical point of view, the limit N →∞ can be justified rigorously in the fol-
lowing sense: under suitable conditions, if there exists a family of measures (µt)0≤t≤T together
with an optimally controlled process in (10–11) with (µt)0≤t≤T as marginal distributions ex-
actly, then the corresponding optimal feedback φ∗ is proven to provide an ε-Nash equilibrium
to the N -player-game (9) for N large. (See [3, 6].) The argument relies on standard theory of
propagation of chaos for McKean–Vlasov diffusion processes. (See [22].) As a by-product, the
empirical measure of the N -player system, when driven by φ∗, does indeed converge toward
(µt)0≤t≤T . In such cases, this makes rigorous the MFG approach for searching for an approx-
imate Nash equilibrium to the N -player-game. Still the converse limit property seems to be
much more involved and remains widely open: do the optimal states of the N -player-game
(if exist) converge to some optimal states of (10–11) as N tends to ∞?
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Assuming that the family µ = (µt)0≤t≤T of probability distributions has been frozen, the
Hamiltonian of the stochastic control problem is
Hµt(t, x, y, α) = yb(t, x, µt, α) + f(t, x, µt, α). (12)
Recall that we are limiting ourselves to the case of constant and identical volatilities σ for the
sake of simplicity. In all the examples considered in this paper, there exists a regular function
αˆ satisfying:
αˆ = αˆµt : [0, T ]× R× R 3 (t, x, y) ↪→ αˆ(t, x, y) ∈ arg min
α∈A
Hµt(t, x, y, α). (13)
We denote by Hµt(t, x, y) this infimum:
Hµt(t, x, y) = inf
α∈A
Hµt(t, x, y, α). (14)
In this paper, we solve stochastic control problems using the probabilistic approach based
on the Pontryagin minimum principle and solving the adjoint forward-backward stochastic
differential equations. For the sake of completeness, we review the Lasry–Lions’ approach
using the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB for short) equation leading to the solution of a
forward-backward system of nonlinear Partial Differential Equations (PDEs for short).
HJB / PDE approach
Since µ is frozen, the stochastic control problem is Markovian and we can introduce the HJB
value function:
v(t, x) = inf
α∈At
E
[∫ T
t
f(s,Xs, µs, αs)ds+ g(XT , µT )|Xt = x
]
. (15)
where At denotes the set of admissible controls over the interval [t, T ]. We expect that the
HJB value function v is the solution in some sense (most likely in the viscosity sense only) of
the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation (see [10])
∂tv +
σ2
2
∂2xxv +Hµt(t, x, ∂xv(t, x)) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R, (16)
with terminal condition v(T, x) = g(x, µT ), x ∈ R.
In the end, we would like µ = (µt)0≤t≤T to be the flow of marginal distributions of the
optimally controlled private state. Clearly, this sounds like a circular argument at this stage
since this stochastic differential equation actually depends upon µ, and it seems that only
a fixed point argument can resolve such a quandary. In any case, the flow of statistical
distributions should satisfy Kolmogorov’s equation. In other words, if we use the notation
β(t, x) = b(t, x, µt, φ(t, x))
where φ is the optimal feedback control (think of φ(t, x) = αˆµt(t, x, ∂xv(t, x))), then the flow
(νt)0≤t≤T of measures should be given by νt = L(Xt) and satisfy Kolmogorov’s equation
∂tν − σ
2
2
∂2xxν − div(β(t, x)ν) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R, (17)
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with initial condition ν0 = µ0. This PDE can be given a rigorous meaning in the sense of
distributions. When νt has a smooth density, integration by part can be used to turn the
formal PDE (17) for ν into a classical PDE for the density of ν.
Setting νt = L(Xt) = µt when (Xt)0≤t≤T is the diffusion optimally controlled by the
feedback function φ gives a system of coupled nonlinear forward-backward PDEs (16)–(17),
called the MFG PDE system. See [15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 11].
Stochastic Maximum Principle / FBSDE Approach
Given the frozen flow of measures µ, the stochastic optimization problem is a standard stochas-
tic control problem and as such, its solution can be approached via the stochastic Pontryagin
principle. For each open-loop adapted control α = (αt)0≤t≤T , we denote by Xα = (X
α
t )0≤t≤T
the associated state; any solution (Yt, Zt)0≤t≤T of the BSDE
dYt = −∂xHµt
(
t,Xt, Yt, αt
)
dt+ ZtdWt, t ∈ [0, T ] ; YT = ∂xg(XT , µT ), (18)
is called a set of adjoint processes and the BSDE (18) is called the adjoint equation. The nec-
essary condition of the stochastic Pontryagin principle says that, whenever Xα is an optimal
state of the optimization problem, it must hold Hµt(t,Xt, Yt, αt) = Hµt(t,Xt, Yt), t ∈ [0, T ].
(See [25].) Conversely, when the HamiltonianHµt is convex with respect to the variables (x, α)
and the terminal cost g is convex with respect to the variable x, the forward component of
any solution to the FBSDE{
dXt = b
(
t,Xt, µt, αˆ
µt(t,Xt, Yt)
)
dt+ σdWt,
dYt = −∂xHµt
(
t,Xt, Yt, αˆ
µt(t,Xt, Yt)
)
dt+ ZtdWt,
with the right initial condition for X0 and the terminal condition YT = ∂xg(XT , µT ), is an
optimally controlled path for (10). In particular, if we want to include the matching condition
of the MFG approach as outlined earlier, namely if we want to enforce µt = L(Xt), the above
stochastic forward-backward system turns into
dXt = b
(
t,Xt,L(Xt), αˆL(Xt)(t,Xt, Yt)
)
dt+ σdWt,
dYt = −∂xHL(Xt)
(
t,Xt, Yt, αˆ
L(Xt)(t,Xt, Yt)
)
dt+ ZtdWt,
(19)
with the right initial condition for X0 and with the terminal condition YT = ∂xg(XT ,L(XT )).
This FBSDE is of the McKean–Vlasov type as formally introduced in Subsection 6.1. If
convexity (as described above) holds, it characterizes the optimal states of the MFG problem.
If convexity fails, it provides a necessary condition only.
2.3 Search for Cooperative Equilibriums: Taking the Limit N →∞ First
As before, we assume that all the players use the same feedback function φ, but the notion of
optimality is now defined in terms of what it takes for a feedback function φ∗ to be critical.
In the search for a first order condition, for each player i, when φ∗ is perturbed into φ, we
now assume that all the players j 6= i also use the perturbed feedback function. In other
words, they use the controls αjt = φ(t,X
j
t ) for j = 1, · · · , i − 1, i + 1, · · · , N . In this case,
the perturbation of φ∗ has a significant impact on the empirical distribution µNt , and the
optimization cannot be performed after the latter is frozen, as in the case of the search for
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a Nash equilibrium. In the present situation, the simplification afforded by taking the limit
N →∞ is required before we perform the optimization.
Assuming that the feedback function φ is fixed, at least temporarily, the theory of propaga-
tion of chaos states that, if we consider the solution XNt = (X
N,1
t , · · · , XN,Nt ) of the system of
N stochastic differential equations (8) with αit = φ(t,X
N,i
t ), then in the limit N →∞, for any
fixed integer k, the joint distribution of the k-dimensional process {(XN,1t , · · · , XN,kt )}0≤t≤T
converges to a product distribution (in other words the k processes (XN,it )0≤t≤T for i =
1, · · · , k become independent in the limit) and the distribution of each single marginal pro-
cess converges toward the distribution of the unique solution X = (Xt)0≤t≤T of the McKean–
Vlasov evolution equation
dXt = b(t,Xt,L(Xt), φ(t,Xt))dt+ σdW˜t (20)
where (W˜t)0≤t≤T is a standard Wiener process. So if the common feedback control function
φ is fixed, in the limit N →∞, the private states of the players become independent of each
other, and for each given i, the distribution of the private state process (XN,it )0≤t≤T evolving
according to (8) converges toward the distribution of the solution of (20). So if we optimize
after taking the limit N → ∞, i.e. assuming that the limit has already been taken, the
objective of each player becomes the minimization of the functional
J(φ) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xt,L(Xt), φ(t,Xt))dt+ g(XT ,L(XT ))
]
(21)
over a class of admissible feedback controls φ. Minimization of (21) over φ under the dynam-
ical constraint (20) is a form of optimal stochastic control where the controls are in closed
loop feedback form. More generally, such a problem can be stated as in (10) for open loop
controls α = (αt)0≤t≤T adapted to any specific information structure:
α∗ = arg min
α
E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xt,L(Xt), αt)dt+ g(XT ,L(XT ))
]
subject to (22)
dXt = b(t,Xt,L(Xt), αt)dt+ σdWt, t ∈ [0, T ].
Naturally, we call this problem the optimal control of the stochastic McKean-Vlasov dynamics.
Here as well, the limit N →∞ can be justified rigorously: under suitable conditions, optimal
feedback controls in (22) are proven to be ε-optimal controls for the N -player-system when
N is large, provided that the rule we just prescribed above is indeed in force, that is: any
perturbation of the feedback is felt by all the players in a similar way. (See [5].)
Standard techniques from stochastic control of Markovian systems cannot be used for
this type of stochastic differential equations and a solution to this problem is not known
in general, even though solutions based on appropriate analogs of the Pontryagin minimum
principle have been sought for by several authors. We first review the results of [1] which are
the only published ones which we know of. They only concern scalar interactions for which
the dependence upon the probability measure of the drift and cost functions are of the form
b(t, x, µ, α) = b(t, x, 〈ψ, µ〉, α), f(t, x, µ, α) = f(t, x, 〈γ, µ〉, α), g(x, µ) = g(x, 〈ζ, µ〉)
for some functions ψ, γ, and ζ. Recall that we use the duality notation 〈ϕ, µ〉 to denote
the integral of the function ϕ with respect to the measure µ. Notice that we use the same
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notations b, f and g for functions where the variable µ, which was a measure, is replaced by
a numeric variable. As we explained earlier, this setting could be sufficient for the analysis
of most of the linear quadratic models we consider in Sections 3 and 4. We review the more
general results [6] of the first two named authors in Section 6.
The major difference with the classical case is in the form of the adjoint equation. Given
a control process α = (αt)0≤t≤T and a process X = (Xt)0≤t≤T satisfying
dXt = b(t,Xt,L(Xt), αt)dt+ σdWt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (23)
a pair of processes Y = (Yt)0≤t≤T and Z = (Zt)0≤t≤T is said to form a pair of adjoint processes
if they satisfy:
dYt = −[∂xb(t,Xt,E{ψ(Xt)}, αt)Yt + ∂xf(t,Xt,E{γ(Xt)}, αt)]dt+ ZtdWt
−[E{∂x′b(t,Xt,E{ψ(Xt)}, αt)Yt}∂xψ(Xt) + E{∂x′f(t,Xt,E{γ(Xt)}, αt)}∂xγ(Xt)]dt
YT = ∂xg(XT ,E{ζ(XT )}) + E{∂x′g(XT ,E{ζ(XT )})}∂xζ(XT ).
(24)
This BSDE, which is of the McKean–Vlasov type as its coefficients depend upon the distri-
bution of the solution, is called the adjoint equation. It provides a necessary condition for
the optimal states of the MKV optimal control problem, that is, for any optimally controlled
path, it must hold:
H˜(t,Xt, Yt, αt) = inf
α∈A
H˜(t,Xt, Yt, α) (25)
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. The Hamiltonian H˜ appearing in (25) is defined, for any random variable ξ,
as:
H˜(t, ξ, y, α) = yb(t, ξ,E{ψ(ξ)}, α) + f(t, ξ,E{γ(ξ)}, α). (26)
This result is proven in [1] (with the assumption that A is convex and that H˜ is convex in
the variable α). The sufficiency condition is given by (see [1] as well):
Theorem 2.1. Assume that
(A1) g is convex in (x, x′);
(A2) the partial derivatives ∂x′f and ∂x′g are non-negative;
(A3) the Hamiltonian H is convex in (x, x′1, x′2, α);
(A4) the function ψ is affine and the functions γ and ζ are convex;
where the Hamiltonian function H is defined as:
H(t, x, x′1, x
′
2, y, α) = yb(t, x, x
′
1, α) + f(t, x, x
′
2, α). (27)
If X = (Xt)0≤t≤T satisfies (23) for some control process α = (αt)0≤t≤T , if Y = (Yt)0≤t≤T
and Z = (Zt)0≤t≤T form a pair of adjoint processes and if (25) holds for all t ∈ [0, T ] (almost
surely), then the control α = (αt)0≤t≤T is optimal.
2.4 Summary
The dichotomy in purpose suggested by the two notions of equilibrium discussed above points
to two different paths to go from the North East corner to the South West corner of the
following diagram, and the thrust of the paper is to provide insight, and demonstrate by
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examples that which path one chooses has consequences on the properties of the equilibrium,
in other words, the diagram is not commutative.
SDE State Dynamics
for N players
Optimization
>
Nash Equilibrium
for N players
McKean Vlasov Dynamics
limN→∞∨
Optimization
>
Mean Field Game?
Controlled McK-V Dynamics?
limN→∞∨
It is important to emphasize one more time what we mean by the limit N → ∞. We want
to identify properties of the limit which, when re-injected into the game with finitely many
players, give an approximate solution to the problem we are unable to solve directly for the
stochastic game with N players.
First Discussion of the Differences
In the present context where we assume that the volatility σ is constant, the general form of
MKV dynamics is given by the solution of non-standard stochastic differential equations in
which the distribution of the solution appears in the coefficients:
dXt = b(t,Xt,L(Xt), αt)dt+ σdWt, X0 = x, (28)
where σ is a positive constant. For a given admissible control α = (αt)0≤t≤T we write Xα for
the unique solution to (28), which exists under the usual growth and Lipchitz conditions on
the function b, see [22] for example. The problem is to optimally control this process so as to
minimize the expectation:
JMKV(α) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X
α
t ,L(Xαt ), αt)dt+ g(XαT ,L(XαT ))
]
. (29)
On the other hand, the dynamics arising in the MFG approach are given by the solution of
a standard stochastic differential equation:
dXt = b(t,Xt, µt, αt)dt+ σdWt, X0 = x, (30)
where µ = (µt)0≤t≤T is a deterministic function with values in the space of probability mea-
sures, which can be understood as a (temporary) proxy or candidate for the anticipated
statistical distribution of the random variables Xt. The expectation that has to be minimized
is now:
JMFG(α) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X
α
t , µt, αt)dt+ g(X
α
T , µT )
]
, (31)
and an equilibrium takes place if, for an optimal control α, the anticipated distribution µt
actually coincides with L(Xαt ) for every t ∈ [0, T ]. While very similar, the two problems differ
by a very important point: the timing of the optimization.
In the MKV control problem (28)-(29), at each time t, the statistical distribution µt is
matched to the distribution of the state, and once we have µt = L(Xt), then we do optimize
the objective function. On the other hand, for the MFG problem (30)–(31), the optimization
is performed for each fixed family µ = (µt)0≤t≤T of probability distributions, and once the
optimization is performed, one matches the distributions µt to the laws of the optimally
controlled process.
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3 Mean Field Linear Quadratic (LQ) Games
This section is devoted to a class of models for which we can push the analysis further, to the
point of deriving explicit formulas in some cases. We choose coefficients of the linear-quadratic
type, that is
b(t, x, µ, α) = atx+ atµ+ btα+ βt,
f(t, x, µ, α) =
1
2
ntα
2 +
1
2
(mtx+mtµt)
2, g(x, µ) =
1
2
(qx+ q µ)2
where at, at, bt, βt, mt, mt and nt are deterministic continuous functions of t ∈ [0, T ], and q
and q are deterministic. Recall that we use the notation µ for the mean of the measure µ, i.e.
µ =
∫
xdµ(x).
3.1 Solving the N-player Game
Under specific assumptions on the coefficients, existence of open loop Nash equilibriums for
Linear Quadratic (LQ for short) stochastic differential games of the type considered in this
section can be proven using the stochastic Pontryagin principle approach. See for example
[12]. We re-derive these results in the case of mean field models considered in this paper.
As in our introductory discussion, we assume that individual private states are one dimen-
sional. This assumption is not essential, its goal is only to keep the notation to a reasonable
level of complexity. See nevertheless Remark 2 below. Moreover, we also assume that the
actions of the individual players are also one-dimensional (i.e. A = R). Using lower cases for
all the examples tackled below, the dynamics of the private states rewrite:
dxit = [atx
i
t + atxt + btα
i
t + βt]dt+ σdW
i
t , i = 1, · · · , N, t ∈ [0, T ]; xi0 = x(0),
where x(0) is a given initial condition in R and xt stands for the empirical mean:
xt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xit.
Similarly, the individual costs become:
J i(α) = E
{∫ T
0
1
2
[
nt(α
i
t)
2 + (mtx
i
t +mtxt)
2
]
dt+
1
2
(qxiT + q xT )
2
}
, i = 1, · · · , N.
We will assume throughout the section that inft∈[0,T ] bt > 0 and inft∈[0,T ] nt > 0.
3.2 Implementing the MFG Approach
As explained earlier, the first step of the MFG approach is to fix a flow µ = (µt)0≤t≤T of
probability measures in lieu of the empirical measures of the players’ private states, and solve
the resulting control problem for one single player. Since the empirical measure of the players’
private states enters only the state equations and the cost functions through its mean, it is
easier to choose a real valued deterministic function (µt)0≤t≤T (which we should denote µ in
order to be consistent with the convention used so far in our notation system) as a proxy for
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the mean of the empirical distribution of the private states. Then the individual stochastic
control problem is to minimize
J(α) = E
{∫ T
0
[
nt
2
α2t +
1
2
(mtxt +mtµt)
2]dt+
1
2
(qxT + q µT )
2
}
subject to the dynamical constraint
dxt = [atxt + atµt + btαt + βt]dt+ σdWt, t ∈ [0, T ],
with x0 = x
(0) as initial condition. Given that the deterministic function t ↪→ µt is assumed
fixed, the Hamiltonian of the stochastic control problem is equal to
Hµt(t, x, y, α) = y[atx+ atµt + btα+ βt] +
1
2
(mtx+mtµt)
2 +
1
2
ntα
2. (32)
The optimal control αˆ minimizing the Hamiltonian is given by:
αˆ(t, y) = − bt
nt
y, t ∈ [0, T ], y ∈ R, (33)
and the minimum Hamiltonian by
Hµt(t, x, y) = inf
α∈A
Hµt(t, x, y, α) = (atx+ atµt + βt)y +
1
2
(mtx+mtµt)
2 − 1
2
b2t
nt
y2.
Stochastic Pontryagin Principle Approach
In the present situation, the adjoint equation reads:
dyt = −[atyt +mt(mtxt +mtµt)]dt+ ztdWt, yT = q(qxT + q µT ). (34)
Notice that because of the special form of the coefficients, this BSDE does not involve the
control αˆt explicitly. By (33), the optimal control has the form αˆt = −n−1t btyt, so that the
forward dynamics of the state become:
dxt = [atxt + atµt −
b2t
nt
yt + βt]dt+ σdWt, x0 = x
(0), (35)
and the problem reduces to the proof of the existence of a solution to the standard FBSDE
(34)–(35) and the analysis of the properties of such a solution. In particular, we will need to
check that this solution is amenable to the construction of a fixed point for µ. Notice that,
once this FBSDE is solved, (33) will provide us with an open loop optimal control for the
problem.
In a first time, we remind the reader of elementary properties of linear FBSDEs. We thus
streamline the notation and rewrite the FBSDE as{
dxt = [atxt + btyt + ct]dt+ σdWt, x0 = x
(0),
dyt = [mtxt − atyt + dt]dt+ ztdWt, yT = qxT + r,
(36)
where in order to better emphasize the linear nature of the FBSDE we set:
at = at, bt = −b2t /nt, ct = βt + atµt, mt = −m2t , dt = −mtmtµt, q = q2, r = qq µT .
13
Linear FBSDEs of the form (36) have been studied in [23, 24], but for the sake of completeness
we construct a solution from scratch recalling some basic facts of the theory. Because of the
linearity of the system (36), we expect the FBSDE value function to be affine in the space
variable, so we search for deterministic functions ηt and χt such that
yt = ηtxt + χt, t ∈ [0, T ]. (37)
Computing dyt from this ansatz using the expression of dxt from (36) we get
dyt = [(η˙t + atηt + btη
2
t )xt + χ˙t + btηtχt + ctηt]dt+ σηtdWt, t ∈ [0, T ],
and identifying term by term with the expression of dyt given in (36) we get:
η˙t = −btη2t − 2atηt + mt, ηT = q
χ˙t + (at + btηt)χt = dt − ctηt, χT = r
zt = σηt.
(38)
The first equation is a Riccati equation. According to the classical theory of Ordinary Differ-
ential Equations (ODEs for short), its solution may be obtained by solving the second order
linear equation
−btθ¨t + [b˙t − 2atbt]θ˙t + mtb2t θt = 0,
with terminal conditions θT = 1 and θ˙T = bT q, and setting ηt = (btθt)
−1θ˙t, provided there
is a solution t ↪→ θt which does not vanish. In the framework of control theory, the first
equation in (38) can be also reformulated as the Riccati equation deriving from a deterministic
control problem of linear-quadratic type. Namely, the adjoint system associated with the
minimization of the cost function (with the same notations as in (36)):
J(α) =
1
2
qξ2T +
∫ T
0
1
2
[
α2t −mtξ2t
]
dt (39)
over the control (αt)0≤t≤T , subject to
dξt = [atξt − (−bt)1/2αt]dt, t ∈ [0, T ]; ξ0 = x(0),
admits the first equation in (38) as Riccati factorization. Here, q and −m are non-negative
so that the minimization problem (39) has a unique optimal path and the Riccati equation
is solvable. (See Theorem 37 in [21].) Therefore, the system (38) is solvable.
As a by-product, we deduce that the forward-backward system (36) is solvable. By the
stochastic minimum principle, the solution is even unique. Indeed, the forward-backward
system (36) describes the optimal states of the stochastic control problem driven by the cost
functional
J(α) = E
[
1
2
qξ2T +
∫ T
0
1
2
[
α2t −mtξ2t − 2dtξt
]
dt
]
(40)
depending upon the control (αt)0≤t≤T , subject to
dξt = [atξt − (−bt)1/2αt + ct]dt+ σdWt, t ∈ [0, T ]; ξ0 = x(0). (41)
Since the cost coefficients in J are convex in x and strictly convex in α and since the drift
in (41) is linear in x and α, the stochastic minimum principle says that the optimal control
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must be unique. Uniqueness of the solution to (36) follows directly. (See [20].) Notice that
the convexity of the cost functions holds in the original problem (34–35).
Going back to the notations in (34)–(35), we deduce that the system (34)–(35) is always
uniquely solvable when µ is given. The point is thus to construct a fixed point for µ =
(µt)0≤t≤T . If a fixed point does exist, that is if we can solve the system (34)–(35) with the
constraint µt = E(xt) for t ∈ [0, T ], then the pair (µt = E(xt), yt = E(yt))0≤t≤T solves the
deterministic forward-backward system:
dµt = [(at + at)µt −
b2t
nt
yt + βt]dt, µ0 = x
(0)
0 ,
dyt = −[atyt +mt(mt +mt)µt)]dt, yT = q(q + q)µT .
(42)
Conversely, if the system (42) is solvable, then µ satisfies the fixed point condition for the
mean-field game of linear-quadratic type since the linear system
dxt = [atxt + atµt −
b2t
nt
yt + βt]dt
dyt = −[atyt +mt(mtxt +mtµt)]dt, yT = q(qxT + qµT ),
(43)
has a unique solution. Indeed, (43) is of the same structure as (36), with σ = 0 but with the
right sign conditions for (b2t /nt)0≤t≤T , for (m2t )0≤t≤T and for q2, which is enough to repeat
the analysis from (37) to (41).
Similarly, the key point for the solvability of (42) is to reformulate it as the adjoint system
of a deterministic control problem of linear-quadratic type. Specifically, the minimization
problem of the cost function
J(α) =
1
2
eT q(q + q)ξ
2
T +
∫ T
0
1
2
[
etntα
2
t + etmt(mt +mt)ξ
2
t
]
dt,
subject to
dξt = [(at + at)ξt + btαt + βt]dt and et = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
asds
)
,
admits as adjoint system:
dξt = [(at + at)ξt −
b2t
etnt
ζt + βt]dt
dζt = −[etmt(mt +mt)ξt + (at + at)ζt]dt, ζT = eT q(q + q)ξT .
(44)
Clearly, (ξ, ζ) is a solution of (44) if and only if (ξ, e−1ζ) is a solution of (42). Unique
solvability of (44) is known to hold in short time. In the case when q(q + q) ≥ 0 and
inft∈[0,T ][mt(mt + mt)] ≥ 0, the optimization problem has a unique optimal path over any
arbitrarily prescribed duration T and the associated adjoint system (44) is uniquely solvable
in finite time as well. In both cases, the fixed point for µ does exist and is unique:
Theorem 3.1. On the top of the hypotheses already stated in Subsection 3.1, assume that
q(q + q) ≥ 0 and inft∈[0,T ][mt(mt + mt)] ≥ 0, then, given an initial condition for x, there
exists a unique continuous deterministic function [0, T ] 3 t ↪→ µt such that system (34)–(35)
admits a unique solution (x, y) satisfying µt = E(xt) for any t ∈ [0, T ].
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Remark 2. We claimed that limiting ourselves to the one dimensional case d′ = 1 was
not restrictive, but it is only fair to mention that, in the higher dimensional framework, the
solution of matrix valued Riccati’s equations is more involved and requires extra assumptions
and that the change of variable (ξ, ζ) ↪→ (ξ, e−1ζ) used in (44) to reformulate (42) cannot be
used in such a straightforward way.
We just explained that a fixed point for µ could be constructed by investigating the
unique solvability of a linear forward-backward ordinary differential equation. Going back
to the general discussion (36)–(38), the solvability of a linear forward-backward equation of
deterministic or stochastic type (as in (36)) reduces to the solvability of a Riccati equation of
the same type as the first equation in (38). In practice, once (ηt)0≤t≤T in (38) is computed,
the point is to plug its value in the third equation to determine (zt)0≤t≤T , and in the second
equation, which can then be solved by:
χt = re
∫ T
t [au+buηu]du −
∫ T
t
[ds − csηs]e
∫ s
t [au+buηu]duds. (45)
(When the Riccati equation is well-posed, its solution does not blow up and all the terms
above are integrable.) Now that the deterministic functions (ηt)0≤t≤T and (χt)0≤t≤T are
computed, we rewrite the forward stochastic differential equation for the dynamics of the
state using the ansatz (37):
dxt = [(at + btηt)xt + btχt + ct]dt+ σdWt, x0 = x
(0).
Such a stochastic differential equation is solved explicitly
xt = x
(0)e
∫ t
0 (au+buηu)du +
∫ t
0
(bsχs + cs)e
∫ t
s (au+buηu)duds+ σ
∫ t
0
e
∫ t
s (au+buηu)dudWs. (46)
A Simple Example
For the sake of illustration, we consider the frequently used example where the drift b reduces
to the control, namely b(t, x, µ, α) = α, so that at = at = βt = 0, bt = 1 and the state equation
reads
dxt = αtdt+ σdWt, t ∈ [0, T ]; x0 = x(0).
We also assume that the running cost is simply the square of the control, i.e. f(t, x, µ, α) =
α2/2 and nt = 1 and mt = mt = 0. Using the notations and the results above, we see that
the FBSDE of the MFG approach has the simple form{
dxt = −ytdt+ σdWt,
dyt = ztdWt,
t ∈ [0, T ]; x0 = x(0), yT = qxT + r, (47)
which we solve by postulating yt = ηtxt + χt, and solving for the two deterministic functions
η an χ. We find:
ηt =
q
1 + q(T − t) , χt =
r
1 + q(T − t) ,
(keep in mind that q ≥ 0 so that the functions above are well-defined) and plugging these
expressions into (46) we get
xt = x
(0) 1 + q(T − t)
1 + qT
− rt
1 + qT
+ σ[1 + q(T − t)]
∫ t
0
dWs
1 + q(T − s) . (48)
16
Notice further that the optimal control αt and the adjoint process yt satisfy
−αt = yt = q
1 + q(T − t)xt +
r
1 + q(T − t)
and that the only quantity depending upon the fixed mean function t ↪→ µt is the constant
r = qq µT , which depends only upon the mean state at the end of the time interval. Recalling
that q = q2, this makes the search for a fixed point very simple and one easily check that if
µT =
x(0)
1 + q(q + q)T
(49)
then the mean at time T of the random variable xT given by (48) is µT .
Remark 3. From (49), we deduce that a fixed point does exist (and in such a case is unique)
if 1 + q(q + q)T > 0. In the case when q(q + q) ≥ 0, this is always true, as announced in
Theorem 3.1. If q(q + q) < 0, the condition is satisfied if T is small enough only.
4 Control of Mean Field LQ McKean Vlasov Dynamics
As before, we restrict ourselves to the one-dimensional case. The problem of the optimal
control of the Linear Quadratic McKean-Vlasov dynamics consists in the minimization of the
functional
J(α) = E
[∫ T
0
[1
2
(
mtxt +mtE{xt}
)2
+
1
2
ntα
2
t
]
dt+
1
2
(
qxT + qE{xT }
)2]
(50)
over all the admissible control processes α = (αt)0≤t≤T under the constraint
dxt =
[
atxt + atE{xt}+ btαt + βt
]
dt+ σdWt, t ∈ [0, T ]; x0 = x(0). (51)
As in the case of the MFG approach, we assume that all the coefficients at, at, bt, βt, mt,
mt, nt are deterministic continuous functions of t ∈ [0, T ], and that q and q are deterministic
constants. We also assume the function nt to be positive. So in the notation of the Pontryagin
principle introduced earlier (recall Theorem 2.1), we have
ψ(x) = γ(x) = ζ(x) = x, b(t, x, x′, α) = atx+ atx′ + btα+ βt,
f(t, x, x′, α) =
1
2
(mtx+mtx
′)2 +
1
2
ntα
2, g(x, x′) =
1
2
(qx+ qx′)2,
for (t, x, x′) ∈ [0, T ]× R× R, so that the adjoint equation becomes
dyt = −
[
atyt +mt(mtxt +mtE{xt})
]
dt− [atE{yt}+mt(mt +mt)E{xt}]dt+ ztdWt,
yT = q
(
qxT + qE{xT }
)
+ q(q + q)E{xT }.
(52)
Notice that because of the special form of the coefficients, this BSDE does not involve the
control αt explicitly. The control appears only indirectly, through the state xt and its mean
E{xt}. Notice also that the sign condition on the derivatives ∂x′f and ∂x′g in (A2) in Theorem
2.1 is not satisfied since these two are linear functions. A careful look at the proof of Theorem
2.1 shows that the sign condition is actually useless when the functions γ and ζ are linear,
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as it is the case here. In order to apply the Pontryagin minimum principle, we guess the
candidate for the optimal control by minimizing the Hamiltonian:
αˆ(t, x, x′, y) = arg min
α∈R
H(t, x, x′, y, α),
= arg min
α∈R
{
y
[
atx+ atx
′ + btα+ βt
]
+
1
2
(mtx+mtx
′)2 +
1
2
ntα
2
}
.
Notice that, here, there is one and only one variable x′ in the Hamiltonian and not two
variables x′1 and x′2 as in (27). The reason is that the functions ψ, γ and ζ coincide. The first
order condition gives:
ybt + ntαˆ(t, x, x
′, y) = 0, (t, x, x′, y) ∈ [0, T ]× R3,
so that we choose
αˆt = − bt
nt
yt, t ∈ [0, T ], (53)
as candidate for the optimal control. With this choice, the dynamics of the optimal state
become:
dxt =
[
atxt + atE{xt} − b
2
t
nt
yt + βt
]
dt+ σdWt, t ∈ [0, T ]; x0 = x(0), (54)
and the problem reduces to the proof of the existence of a solution to the following FBSDE
of the McKean–Vlasov type (and to the analysis of the properties of such a solution):
dxt =
[
atxt + atE{xt} − b
2
t
nt
yt + βt
]
dt+ σdWt, x0 = x
(0),
dyt = −
[
atyt +mt(mtxt +mtE{xt})
]
dt
−[atE{yt}+mt(mt +mt)E{xt}]dt+ ztdWt,
yT = q
(
qxT + qE{xT }
)
+ q(q + q)E{xT }.
(55)
Since these equations are linear, we can solve first for the functions t ↪→ E{xt} and t ↪→ E{yt}.
Indeed, taking expectations on both sides of (55) and rewriting the resulting system –using
the notation xt and yt for the expectations E{xt} and E{yt} respectively–, we obtain:dxt =
[
(at + at)xt − b
2
t
nt
yt + βt
]
dt, x0 = x
(0),
dyt = −
[
(at + at)yt + (mt +mt)
2xt
]
dt, yT = (q + q)
2xT .
(56)
This system is of the same type as (36), with σ = 0 therein, but with the right sign conditions
for (bt)0≤t≤T , (mt)0≤t≤T and q. In particular, we know from the previous analysis (37–41)
that (56) is uniquely solvable. The solution has the form yt = ηtxt +χt for two deterministic
functions ηt and χt satisfying
η˙t =
b2t
nt
η2t − 2(at + at)ηt − (mt +mt)2, ηT = (q + q)2
χ˙t − [
b2t
nt
ηt − (at + at)]χt = −βtηt, χT = 0.
(57)
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Once ηt is computed, we plug its value in the second equation in (57), which can then be
solved as in (45). The deterministic functions ηt and χt being computed, we solve for xt and
yt by plugging our ansatz yt = ηtxt + χt into the first equation of (56), as done in (46).
We can now replace the expectations E{xt} and E{yt} appearing in the FBSDE (55) of
the McKean–Vlasov type by the deterministic functions xt and yt obtained by solving the
forward backward system of ODEs (56), and solve the linear FBSDE{
dxt = [atxt + btyt + ct]dt+ σdWt, x0 = x
(0)
dyt = [mtxt − atyt + dt]dt+ ztdWt, yT = qxT + r,
(58)
where for the purpose of this part of the proof, and in order to lighten the notation, we use
the same kind of notation we used in the case of the MFG approach by setting:
at = at, bt = −b2t /nt, ct = βt + atxt,
mt = −m2t , dt = −mt(2mt +mt)xt − atyt, q = q2, r = q(2q + q)xT .
Here as well, we are in the framework of equation (36), with the right-sign conditions, so that
equation (58) is uniquely solvable. The pair process (E{xt},E{yt})0≤t≤T is then the solution
to an ordinary forward-backward system, which is also of the same type as (36): the solution
must be the pair (xt, yt)0≤t≤T so that (55) is uniquely solvable. Clearly, the FBSDE value
function is affine, that is
yt = ηtxt + χt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (59)
for some (ηt)0≤t≤T and (χt)0≤t≤T given by a system of the same type as (38). We claim:
Proposition 4.1. Under the current assumptions, for a given initial condition for the forward
equation, the FBSDE (55) is uniquely solvable.
Once (ηt)0≤t≤T and (χt)0≤t≤T in (59) are determined by solving the corresponding Riccati
equation, we rewrite the forward stochastic differential equation for the dynamics of the state:
dxt =
[
(at + btηt)xt + btχt + ct
]
dt+ σdWt, t ∈ [0, T ]; x0 = x(0),
which is solved explicitly, as in (46).
Notice that (46) shows that the optimally controlled state is still Gaussian despite the non-
linearity due to the McKean-Vlasov nature of the dynamics. While the expectation E{xt} = xt
was already computed, expression (46) can be used to compute the variance of xt as a function
of time. Because of the linearity of the ansatz and the fact that ηt and χt are deterministic,
the adjoint process (yt)0≤t≤T is also Gaussian.
Remark 4. Using again the form of the ansatz, we see that the optimal control αt which was
originally identified as an open loop control in (53), is in fact in closed loop feedback form
since it can be rewritten as
αt = − bt
nt
ηtxt − bt
nt
χt (60)
via the feedback function φ(t, ξ) = −bt(ηtξ + χt)/nt which incidently shows that the optimal
control is also a Gaussian process.
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Remark 5. The reader might notice that, within the linear-quadratic framework, the condi-
tions for the unique solvability of the adjoint equations are not the same in the MFG approach
and in the control of MKV dynamics. On the one hand, optimization over controlled MKV
dynamics reads as an optimization problem of purely (strictly) convex nature, for which exis-
tence and uniqueness of an optimal state is expected. On the other hand, the optimal states in
the MFG approach appear as the fixed points of a matching problem. Without any additional
assumptions, there is no reason why this matching problem should derive from a convex po-
tential even if the original coefficients of the game are linear-quadratic. In Theorem 3.1, the
sign conditions on q(q+ q) ≥ 0 and inft∈[0,T ][mt(mt+mt)] ≥ 0 are precisely designed to make
the matching problem (43) be (strictly) convex.
Simple Example
We consider the same example as in the MFG approach where b(t, x, µ, α) = α, so that
at = at = βt = 0, bt = 1 so that the state equation reads
dxt = αtdt+ σdWt, t ∈ [0, T ]; x0 = x(0),
and f(t, x, µ, α) = α2/2, so that nt = 1 and mt = mt = 0. Using the notation and the results
above, we see that the system (55) has the same form as (47), but (q, r) in (47) is now given
by q = q2 and r = q(2q + q)E{xT }. Postulating the relationship yt = ηtxt + χt and solving
for the two deterministic functions η and χ, we find the same expression as in (48):
xt = x
(0) 1 + q(T − t)
1 + qT
− rt
1 + qT
+ σ[1 + q(T − t)]
∫ t
0
dWs
1 + q(T − s) .
This makes the computation of E{xT } very simple. We find
E{xT } = x
(0)
1 + (q + q)2T
,
which always makes sense and which is different from (49).
5 Further Examples
In this section we provide simple examples which do not fit in the linear quadratic mold of
the previous sections, but still allow for an explicit comparison of the solutions of the two
problems. Surprisingly, we shall see that these solutions do coincide in some special cases.
5.1 Some Simple Particular Cases
As in previous sections, we discuss the case when b(t, x, µ, α) = α and f(t, x, µ, α) = α2/2.
When the terminal cost is of quadratic type, the previous analysis shows that, in both cases,
the optimal control is simply the negative of the adjoint process, the difference between the
two cases lying in the shape of the terminal condition of the associated FBSDEs. We discuss
now several related forms of the function g for which we can still conclude.
The case g(x, µ) = rxµ, r ∈ R∗. Here we only compare the end-of-the-period means. We
know from Section 3 that the solution(s) to the MFG problem are given by the FBSDE (47)
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with the terminal condition q = 0 and r = rµT , so that, from (48), the fixed point condition
reads
µT = x
(0) − rµTT, i.e. (1 + rT )µT = x(0), (61)
which says that there exists a unique fixed point when 1 + rT 6= 0. If 1 + rT = 0, then there
is no fixed point if x(0) 6= 0 and there are infinitely many if x(0) = 0. Given µT as in (61),
we know from the analysis in Section 3 that (47) has a unique solution (xt, yt, zt)0≤t≤T . By
(48), it must hold E{xT } = µT , so that (xt, yt, zt)0≤t≤T is the unique equilibrium of the MFG
problem.
When dealing with the control of MKV dynamics with the same choice of coefficients,
the story is rather different. Indeed, the terminal condition g is not convex in the variables
(x, x′), so that Theorem 2.1 does not apply anymore. From [1], we know that the FBSDE
(24) just provides a necessary condition for the optimal states of the optimization problem.
We thus investigate the solutions to (24) as possible candidates for minimizing the related
cost. As above, (24) reduces to (47), with the terminal condition q = 0 and r = 2rE{xT }. By
(48), the necessary condition for E{xT } reads
E{xT } = x(0) − 2rE{xT }T, i.e. (1 + 2rT )µT = x(0),
which says that there exists a unique fixed point when 1 + 2rT 6= 0. When 1 + 2rT = 0, there
is no fixed point unless x(0) = 0. Moreover, the optimal states, when they do exist, must
differ from the optimal states of the MFG problem (unless x(0) = 0).
The case g(x, µ) = rxµ2, r ∈ R∗. We argue as above. In the MFG framework, the fixed
point condition also derives from the FBSDE (47), with the terminal condition q = 0 and
r = rµ2T , and from (48). It reads
µT = x
(0) − rTµ2T , i.e. rTµ2T + µT − x(0) = 0. (62)
By the same argument as in the previous case, given a solution to (62), there exists a unique
solution to (47). In particular, the number of solutions to the MFG problem matches the
number of solutions to (62) exactly.
For the MKV control problem, the FBSDE (47), with the terminal condition q = 0 and
r = 3rE{xT }2, just provides a necessary condition for the existence of optimal states. By
(48), E{xT } must solve:
E{xT } = x(0) − 3rTE{xT }2, i.e. 3rTE{xT }2 + E{xT } − x(0) = 0. (63)
Existence of a solution and uniqueness to the second-order-equations (62) and (63) depend
upon the values of the parameters r, T , and x(0). Let us have a quick look at these issues
in more detail. Let SMFG = {(T, x) ∈ R+ × R; 1 + 4rTx(0) ≥ 0} and SMKV = {(T, x(0)) ∈
R+ × R; 1 + 12rTx(0) ≥ 0}. These represent the sets where the second-order-equations are
solvable. It is easy to see that SMFG ⊂ SMKV when rx(0) > 0, with the converse inclusion
when rx(0) < 0. Moreover, there exists a continuum of triplets (r, T, x(0)) for which there is
at most one solution to the MKV control problem while there are exactly two solutions to the
MFG problem. In particular, if r = −1, T = 1, x(0) = 1/12, then we have (1, 1/6) ∈ SMKV
and (1, (3±√6)/6) ∈ SMFG.
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General Linear Terminal Cost. The two previous examples can be easily generalized to
the case when the terminal cost is of the form g(x, µ) = xγ(µ). In the MFG approach, the
fixed point equation for the mean has the form (compare with (61)):
µT = x
(0) − Tγ(µT ).
For the MKV control problem, it reads
E{xT } = x(0) − T
[
γ′
(
E{xT }
)
E{xT }+ γ
(
E{xT }
)]
.
Quadratic Terminal Cost. When g(x, µ) = x2γ(µ), we deduce, by choosing q = 2γ(µ) and
r = 0 in (47), that, in the MFG approach, the fixed point equation for the mean has the form
µT
(
1 + 2Tγ(µT )
)
= x(0).
For the MVK control problem, the analysis of the adjoint equation cannot be tackled by
investigating the mean of xT first since the terminal condition depends upon the expectation
of the square of xT .
5.2 Additive Running Cost
Here we tackle two examples when b(t, x, µ, α) = α and f 6= 0. In both cases, the terminal
cost g is set equal to 0.
The case f(t, x, µ, α) = α2/2 + xµ. In the MFG approach, we can write the equivalent of
the averaged forward-backward differential equation (43). We get as a fixed point condition
for the mean (µt)0≤t≤T :{
dµt = −ptdt,
dpt = −µtdt,
t ∈ [0, T ]; µ0 = x(0), pT = 0.
This reads as the second-order ODE µ¨t = µt = 0, with µ0 = x
(0) and µ˙T = 0, the solution of
which is given by
µt = x
(0) e
(T−t) + e−(T−t)
eT + e−T
, t ∈ [0, T ].
As in the simple case investigated in the previous subsection, once (µt)0≤t≤T is computed,
the solution to the corresponding FBSDE (19) exists and is unique, since the FBSDE is then
of the same form as (36).
For the MKV problem, convexity does not hold, so that the stochastic minimum principle
provides a necessary condition only. Here it has the form:{
dE{xt} = −E{yt}dt,
dE{yt} = −2E{xt}dt,
t ∈ [0, T ]; E{x0} = x(0), E{yT } = 0.
Again, the above system reduces to a second-order ODE, the solution of which is:
E{xt} = x(0) e
√
2(T−t) + e−
√
2(T−t)
e
√
2T + e−
√
2T
, t ∈ [0, T ].
The linear-quadratic case with zero terminal cost. We finally go back to the LQ
framework. As above, we choose b(t, x, µ, α) = α and g = 0. For the running cost, we
consider the classical case where f(t, x, µ, α) = α2/2 + (x − µ)2/2. Here it is easy to see
that, in both cases, the solution to the adjoint backward equation has zero mean, so that the
expectation of any optimal states must be constant.
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5.3 A Simple Model for Emissions Regulation
For the sake of motivation, we present a toy model of the simplest form of Green House
Gas (GHG) emissions regulation. Our interest in this model is the fact that the mean field
interaction between the players appears naturally in the terminal cost function.
A set {1, . . . , N} of firms compete in an economy where green house gas emissions are
regulated over a period [0, T ], for some T > 0. For each firm i, we denote by Xit the perceived
value at time t of what its own cumulative emissions will be at maturity T , and we assume
that its dynamics satisfy
dXit = (b
i
t − αit)dt+ σitdWt, t ∈ [0, T ]; Xi0 = x(0), (64)
where assumptions on the individual emission rates bit and the volatilities σ
i
t can be chosen
as in [7] for the sake of definiteness. The process (αit)0≤t≤T represents the abatement rate
of firm i, and it can be viewed as the control the firm can exert on its emissions output. In
the case αit ≡ 0, the process (Xit)0≤t≤T gives the perceived cumulative emissions of firm i
in the absence of regulation, situation which is called Business as Usual, BAU in short. At
the start t = 0 of the regulation implementation period, each firm i is allocated a number
Λi of permits (also called certificates of emission, or allowances). The cap Λ
(N) =
∑N
i=1 Λi
can be viewed as the emissions target set by the regulator for the period [0, T ]. If at the
end of the regulation period [0, T ], the aggregate emissions in the economy exceed the cap,
i.e. if
∑N
i=1X
i
T > Λ
(N), then each firm i has to offset its emissions XiT (expressed in CO2
ton equivalent) by redeeming one permit per ton, or by paying a penalty λ for each ton not
covered by a certificate. In other words, firm i has to pay
λi = λ(X
i
T − Λi)+1(Λ(N),∞)
( N∑
j=1
XjT
)
(65)
where we use the notation x+ = max(x, 0) for the positive part of the real number x, and 1A
for the indicator function of the set A. The penalty λ is currently equal to 100 euros in the
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).
Remark 6. In the case of cap-and-trade regulations, a market on which emissions certificates
can be bought and sold is also created as part of the regulation. In order to avoid penalties,
firms whose productions are likely to lead to cumulative emissions in excess of their initial
allocations Λi may engage in buying allowances from firms which expect to meet demand
with less emissions than their own initial allocations. For the sake of simplicity, the present
discussion concentrates on the cap part, and disregards the trade part of the regulation.
In search for an optimal behavior, each firm needs to solve the following optimization
problem. If we assume that the abatement costs for firm i are given by a function ci : R→ R
which is C1 and strictly convex, is normalized to satisfy ci(0) = min ci , and satisfies Inada-
like conditions, (ci(x) = β|x|1+α for some β > 0 and α > 0 is an example of such a cost
function), and if its abatement strategy is αi, its terminal wealth is given by
W iT = w
i −
∫ T
0
ci(αit)dt− λ(XiT − Λi)+1(Λ(N),∞)
( N∑
j=1
XjT
)
,
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where wi stands for the initial wealth of the firm i. Recall that, in our simple model, firms
do not trade allowances. Now if we view the perceived emissions Xit as the private state of
firm i, and if we assume that each firm tries to maximize its expected terminal wealth, or
equivalently minimize the objective function
J i(α) = E
[∫ T
0
ci(αit)dt+ λ(X
i
T − Λi)+1(Λ(N),∞)
( N∑
j=1
XjT
)]
, (66)
where we set αt = (α
1
t , · · · , αNt ), then we have formulated our emission regulation model as
a stochastic differential game. Notice that, in this particular example, the equations (64)
giving the dynamics of the private states Xit are decoupled. However, equations (66) giving
the expected costs to minimize are coupled in a very specific way, namely through the average
of the values of all the private states. Recasting the model in the framework of Section 2, we
see that the drift and running costs of the private states Xit are of the form:
b(t, x, µ, α) = −α, and f(t, x, µ, α) = c(α).
For the sake of simplicity we assume that the BAU drift bit is zero, even if, from a modeling
point of view, this implies that the processes Xi can take negative values. We refer the reader
to [7] for a specific discussion of the positivity of the emissions in similar models. The terminal
cost is given by the function g defined on R× P1(R) by
g(x, µ) = λ(x− Λ)+1{µ>Λ}
where Λ = Λ(N)/N stands for the cap per firm, which is assumed to be independent of N .
The quantity Λ is the relevant form of the cap as it makes sense in the limit N → ∞ of a
large number of firms treated similarly by the regulator.
The Mean Field Game Approximation
If we assume quadratic abatement costs c(α) = α2/2, then the approximate Nash equilibriums
provided by the MFG approach are given by the solutions (xt, yt, zt)0≤t≤T of the FBSDE (47),
with 0 as initial condition and terminal condition
yT = λ1{xT>Λ}1{µT>Λ},
satisfying the matching problem E{xT } = µT , that is
E{xT } = x(0) − TλP{xT > Λ}1{E{xT }>Λ}. (67)
We refer the reader to [7] for the precise derivation of the terminal condition despite the
singularity at Λ. Because of the nonlinearity of the terminal condition, the matching problem
is much more involved than in the linear-quadratic setting. Precisely, the simultaneity of the
nonlinearity of the terminal condition and of the strong coupling between the forward and
backward SDEs makes the fixed point equation rather intricate. In the specific situation when
the running cost is quadratic, as it is here assumed to be, the forward and backward equations
can be decoupled by a Hopf-Cole transformation which suggests to work with an exponential
of the solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. This transformation also applies
to the FBSDE by differentiating the value function of the control problem. Remember that
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the value function of the FBSDE coincides with the derivative of the value function of the
control problem. Therefore it is simpler to investigate the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
directly. In the present set-up, the forward-backward system of nonlinear PDEs describing
the MFG problem reads (compare with (16–17)):
(Kolmogorov) ∂tm− σ
2
2
∂2xxm+ ∂x(−∂xvm) = 0, m(0, ·) = δx(0) ,
(HJB) ∂tv +
σ2
2
∂2xxv −
1
2
(∂xv)
2 = 0, v(T, ·) = λ(· − Λ)+1{mT>Λ},
where the function m(t, · ) is understood as the density of the law of Xt in (19) (or equivalently
as the density of the fixed point (µt)0≤t≤T of the matching problem), so that:
mt = µt =
∫
R
xm(t, x) dx, t ∈ [0, T ],
and v as the HJB value function of the stochastic control problem when the family (µt)0≤t≤T
is frozen. These PDEs are simple enough to be solved by a Hopf-Cole transformation:
v = −σ2 log u↔ u = exp
(
− v
σ2
)
; m = uψ ↔ ψ = m
u
.
Then the pair (u, ψ) solves the simple forward-backward system:
∂tψ − σ
2
2
∂2xxψ = 0, ψ(0, ·) =
1
u(0, x(0))
δx(0) ,
∂tu+
σ2
2
∂2xxu = 0, u(T, ·) = exp
[−λσ−2(· − Λ)+1{mT>Λ}],
consisting of two fundamental heat equations coupled only at the end points of the time
interval.
Now the specific and simple form of the mean-field interaction term mT (depending only
upon the global distribution’s first moment) leads us to distinguish three cases:
The Business As Usual (BAU) Solution. If we assume that the cap is not reached, then
u(T, y) = 1 for all y ∈ R, which implies that, for all (t, y) ∈ [0, T ] × R, we have u(t, y) = 1
and thus v(T, y) = 0. In this framework, the optimal abatement strategy is to do nothing,
i.e. αˆt = 0. This corresponds to BAU. So, in this case, m(t, y) = ϕx(0),σ2t(y), the density of
the Gaussian distribution with mean x(0) and variance σ2t. The fixed point condition for the
Nash equilibrium is then satisfied if:∫
R
yϕx(0),σ2t(y)dy ≤ Λ i.e. x(0) ≤ Λ.
The Abatement Solution. Suppose now that the cap is exceeded. In this case the terminal
condition has the form: v(T, y) = λ(y − Λ)+. An easy computation shows that
v(t, x) = −σ2 log
(∫
R
ϕx,σ2(T−t)(y) exp
[−λσ−2(y − Λ)+]dy), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R.
The optimal feedback is given by ∂xv(t, x), which satisfies the viscous Burgers equation:
∂t
(
∂xv) +
σ2
2
∂2xx
(
∂xv
)− ∂xv∂x(∂xv) = 0, ∂xv(T, ·) = λ1{·>Λ}.
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By the maximum principle, it holds 0 ≤ ∂xv ≤ λ. Therefore, when x(0) > Λ+λT , the optimal
path (xt)0≤t≤T satisfies at maturity:
xT > Λ + σWT , (68)
so that mT > Λ, which guarantees that the fixed point condition for the Nash equilibrium is
satisfied.
Critical Case. If x(0) belongs to the interval (Λ,Λ + λT/2), existence of the fixed point
may fail. Indeed (67) says that a necessary condition for the existence of a fixed point is
E(xT ) > Λ, so that x(0) must satisfy
x(0) ≥ E(xT ) + λTP
{
xT > Λ
}
.
Following the proof of (68), we see that xT ≥ x(0)− λT + σWT ≥ Λ− λT + σWT . Therefore,
x(0) ≥ E(xT ) + λTP
{
σWT > λT
}
> Λ + λTP
{
σWT > λT
}
.
When σ tends to +∞, the inequality degenerates into
x(0) ≥ Λ + λT
2
,
so that, when x(0) < Λ + λT/2, existence of the fixed point fails for σ large enough.
When x(0) ≥ Λ + λT/2, we must refine the previous argument in order to settle the
question of existence of a fixed point. The difficulty is to compute P{xT > Λ}. Using the
expression of m in terms of ψ, we see that:
P
{
xT > Λ
}
=
∫ +∞
Λ
u(T, y)ϕx(0),σ2T (y)dy∫ +∞
−∞
u(T, y)ϕx(0),σ2T (y)dy
.
Moreover, ∫ +∞
Λ
u(T, y)ϕx(0),σ2T (y)dy
= (2pi)−1/2σ−1T−1/2
∫ +∞
0
exp
[−λσ−2y − 1
2
σ−2T−1
(
y − (x(0) − Λ))2]dy
= exp
[
λσ−2
(
λT − 2(x(0) − Λ))/2]Φ(x(0) − Λ− λT
σT 1/2
)
,
where Φ stands for the cumulative distribution function of the standard Gaussian distribution,
so since ∫ Λ
−∞
u(T, y)ϕx(0),σ2T (y) = P{σWT ≤ Λ− x(0)} = Φ
(Λ− x(0)
σT 1/2
)
,
we deduce
P
{
xT > Λ
}
=
exp
[−λσ−2δ]Φ[σ−1T−1/2(−λT/2 + δ)]
exp
[−λσ−2δ]Φ[σ−1T−1/2(−λT/2 + δ)]+ Φ[σ−1T−1/2(−λT/2− δ)] , (69)
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where we have set δ = x(0) − Λ− λT/2.
When δ = 0, P{xT > Λ} = 1/2 so that E{xT } = Λ. This suggests that x(0) = Λ+λT/2 is a
critical initial condition for the existence of a Nash equilibrium. This can be proven rigorously
when σ is large. Keep in mind the fact that existence then fails for x(0) < Λ + λT/2. Indeed,
letting σ tend to +∞ in (69), we obtain
P
{
xT > Λ
}→ 1
2
so that, by (67), E(xT ) > Λ for σ large, and the fixed point condition holds.
An intuitive explanation why the fixed point condition can fail goes as follows. In a
reasonable (from the point of view of the choices of Λ, λ and T ) cap-and-trade scheme, the
cap is expected to be reached to incentivize the implementation of abatement strategies.
However, it is often observed that the cap is not reached at the end of the period. From the
MFG theory viewpoint, the argument is as follows. An individual firm with negligible impact
on the overall emissions can emit whatever it wants without impacting significantly the global
emissions. However, as soon as this becomes everybody’s strategy, the cap is reached.
Search for Cooperative Equilibriums
From an economical point of view, one might think that the search for an approximate Nash
equilibrium is well-adapted to the case when the firms decide of their own strategy without
any significant effect on the strategies of the others. Even if this situation sounds reasonable,
the reader might wonder about the case when some of the firms obey a similar policy. Part of
the answer is then given by Subsection 2.3. Indeed, in the extremal situation when the all the
firms follow the same general strategy, equilibriums are expected to be of the cooperative type,
as described in Subsection 2.3. As the terminal cost function g is non-convex with respect
to the expectation µ, the stochastic Pontryagin principle then provides necessary conditions
only for the optimal strategies. Within this framework, it is then quite remarkable that the
forward-backward equation (24) matches (19) excatly, provided that the expectation of the
emissions at maturity is different from the cap Λ. (So that both equations admit the same
solutions.) The reason why they match is as follows. If the expectation of the emissions at
time T differs from the cap, any slight perturbation of the overall strategy keeps the final
state of the system unchanged: the cap remains either exceeded or respected. Therefore, the
search for a local cooperative equilibrium leads to the same limit optimization problem as the
search for a local Nash equilibrium, which means that the necessary conditions deriving from
the stochastic Pontryagin principle are the same. The case when the mean of the emissions
at maturity fits the cap exactly is much more involved and goes far beyond the scope of the
paper: as shown in [7], the collateral effect of the cap onto the dynamics of the carbon market
is highly singular in the vicinity of the cap when the market has some degeneracy. So is the
case here as the dynamics for the mean are completely degenerate. (The previous paragraph
shows that the dynamics for the mean are related to the inviscid Burgers equation.)
6 General Solvability Results
We argued that optimal paths to both MFG and MKV control problems appear as realizations
of the forward component of the solution of systems of forward-backward stochastic equations
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of MKV type, though the corresponding forward-backward systems are different. On the one
hand, the forward-backward system of the MFG approach appears as a standard forward-
backward system derived from the classical form of the stochastic Pontryagin principle, a
nonlinear term of MKV type appearing as a result of the fixed point argument of the third
step of the MFG approach. On the other hand, as we explained in the special case of scalar
interactions derived from [1], the forward-backward system associated with the MKV control
problem involves additional terms coming from the need to optimize with respect to the
interaction terms.
In this section, we address the solvability of general stochastic forward-backward equations
of MKV type. General solvability results are given and then specialized when the coefficients
of the forward-backward systems derive either from a MFG or a MKV control problem.
Results are stated in a pedagogical manner, almost as a reader’s guide to MFG and MKV
control problems. In particular, they cover, in a more abstract fashion, the results and
computations performed in the linear-quadratic setting (see Sections 3, 4) and for the other
examples discussed in Section 5. Due to the heavy technical nature of the results and their
proofs, we only sketch proofs, all the arguments being detailed in the forthcoming works
[6, 4, 5] by the two first named authors. While statements are given in dimension 1 only,
higher-dimensional versions are available in [6, 4, 5].
6.1 Solvability of General MKV Forward-Backward Stochastic Equations
Forward-backward systems such as (15) and (24) are here understood as special cases of more
general fully coupled forward and backward stochastic differential equations involving the
marginal distributions of the forward and backward solutions. Changing the notation ever
so slightly in order to accommodate the FBSDEs appearing in both analyses, we consider
equations of the form:
dXt = B
(
t,Xt, Yt,L(Xt, Yt)
)
dt+ σdWt
dYt = −F
(
t,Xt, Yt,L(Xt, Yt)
)
dt+ ZtdWt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
(70)
with YT = G(XT ,L(XT )) as terminal condition. As already mentioned, X and Y are both
one dimensional.
Because of the coupled structure of the system, solvability is a hard question to tackle:
fully coupled forward-backward systems are instances of stochastic two-point-boundary-value
problems for which both existence and uniqueness are known to fail under standard Cauchy-
Lipschitz conditions. When the coefficients do not depend on the marginal distributions of
the solutions, the forward and backward equations may be decoupled by taking advantage of
the noise. Indeed, when the noise is non-degenerate, it has a decoupling effect by regularizing
the underlying FBSDE value function. We refer to [8] for a review of this strategy. Recall
that by FBSDE value function, we mean the function u giving Yt as a function of Xt, say
u(t,Xt). When the coefficients B(t, x, y), F (t, x, y) and G(x) are independent of the measure
argument, this value function satisfies the quasilinear PDE
∂tu(t, x) +
1
2
σ2∂2xxu(t, x) +B(t, x, u(t, x))∂xu(t, x) + F (t, x, u(t, x)) = 0, (71)
for t ∈ [0, T ] and x ∈ R, with u(T, x) = G(x).
When the solution interacts with itself, e.g. with its own distribution, the standard Markov
structure breaks down. Indeed, the marginal distribution of the process X at time t is needed
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to compute the transitions towards the future values of the state of the system. Basically,
the Markov property must be considered in a larger space, namely the Cartesian product of
the state space of the forward process, which is R in the present situation, with the space of
probability measures on the state space, which is infinite dimensional if the state space is not
finite. Put it differently, the relationship between Y and X is expected to be of the form:
Yt = v
(
t,Xt,L(Xt)
)
, t ∈ [0, T ], (72)
for some mapping v : [0, T ] × R × P1(R) ↪→ R. The PDE approach is then not sufficient
anymore: the underlying heat kernel derived from the noise still has a smoothing property
in the finite-dimensional component, but does not have any regularizing effect in the infinite-
dimensional direction of u. The regularity of v in (t, x) can be tackled by the very simple
observation: once the law of (X,Y ) in (70) has been computed, (70) reads as a Markovian
FBSDE with u(t, x) = v(t, x,L(Xt)) as value function.
In the forthcoming paper [4], the solvability of the equation is tackled by a compactness
argument and the Schauder fixed point theorem. Because of the expected relationship (72)
between Y and X, the conditional law of Yt given Xt is expected to be a Dirac measure
for any t ∈ [0, T ]. In other words, the law of the pair (Xt, Yt) is expected to have the form
ϕ(t, ·)  µt, where ϕ(t, ·) is a continuous mapping from R into R, µt is a probability measure
on R and ϕ(t, ·)  µt is the measure on R2, obtained as the image (push–forward) of the
distribution µt on R by the mapping R 3 x ↪→ (x, ϕ(t, x)). Given an element µ of the space
E = P1(C([0, T ])) of probability measures on the space C([0, T ]) of real valued continuous
functions on [0, T ] and an element ϕ of the space F = Cb([0, T ]× R) of real valued bounded
continuous functions on [0, T ]× R, we consider the system
dXt = B
(
t,Xt, Yt, ϕ(t, ·)  µt
)
dt+ σdWt
dYt = −F
(
t,Xt, Yt, ϕ(t, ·)  µt
)
dt+ ZtdWt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
(73)
with YT = G(XT , µT ) as terminal condition. Here µ = (µt)0≤t≤T is the flow of marginal
distributions where µt denotes the image (push–forward) of µ under the t-th coordinate map
C([0, T ]) 3 w ↪→ w(t) ∈ R. If this system admits a unique solution, we can consider as output
the measure L(X), which is an element of E, together with the FBSDE value function linking
Y with X, which is an element of F under suitable conditions. The following result is proven
in [4]:
Theorem 6.1. Assume σ > 0 and that B, F and G are bounded Lipschitz continuous with
respect to the space variable for the Euclidean distance, and with respect to the McKean–
Vlasov component for the Wasserstein metric, uniformly in the other variables. Then, the
mapping Φ : (E,F ) 3 (µ, ϕ) 7→ (L(X), u) ∈ E × F , where u is the FBSDE value function
such that Yt = u(t,Xt) for any t ∈ [0, T ], has a fixed point.
Recall that the Wasserstein metric between two probability measures η and η′ on Rd,
d ≥ 1, is the square root of the infimum of ∫R2d |z − z′|2dpi(z, z′) over all the probability
measures pi on R2d admitting η and η′ as marginals.
Notice that given any (µ, ϕ) in E ×F , the forward-backward system is standard, so that
unique solvability holds, see e.g. Delarue [8]. The proof consists in showing that Φ leaves a
bounded closed convex subset Γ ⊂ E×F stable and that the restriction of Φ to Γ is continuous
and has a relatively compact range, E × F being endowed with the product of the topology
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of weak convergence of measures on E and the topology of uniform convergence on compact
sets on F . Boundedness of the coefficients plays a crucial role to prove that the probability
measures in the range of Φ are tight. Positivity of σ ensures that the FBSDE value function
in the range of Φ are Ho¨lder continuous and thus live in a compact subset of F . A complete
proof is given in [4].
The application of Theorem 6.1 to the solvability of the adjoint equations in (19) and
(24) is not so straighforward. Indeed, the coefficients B and F therein derive from a convex
Hamiltonian structure, which means that they appear as derivatives with respect to the state
space parameter (and also possibly with respect to the measure parameter) of the underlying
Hamiltonian function. In practice, the Hamiltonian function is expected to grow at infinity
at a rate which could be quadratic with respect to the state space parameter and the control
variable, so that boundedness of the coefficients B and F is expected to fail. Similarly, the
terminal cost g in (19) and (24) may have quadratic growth, so that the terminal condition in
the adjoint equations is not bounded in practice. As a consequence, refinements of Theorem
6.1 are necessary for our specific purposes.
Here is a first straightforward refined statement of this kind: when the coefficient B grows
at most linearly in (x, y) and L(Xt, Yt), and F and G are bounded, existence of a solution still
holds true. When we say that B is at most of linear growth with respect to (x, y,L(Xt, Yt)),
we mean that
|B(t, x, y,L(Xt, Yt))| ≤ C
[
1 + |x|+ |y|+
(∫
R2
|x′|2dµ(x′)
)1/2]
, µ = L(Xt, Xt).
Solvability follows from a compactness argument again. Approximating the drift B by a
sequence of bounded drifts (Bn)n≥1, we can prove that, for the corresponding solutions
((Xnt , Y
n
t = u
n(t,Xnt ))0≤t≤T )n≥1, the distributions (L(Xn))n≥1 are tight and that the func-
tions (un)n≥1 are equicontinuous on compact subsets of [0, T ] × R. The proof follows from
two key observations: first, since f and g are bounded, the functions (un)n≥1 are uniformly
bounded, so that the processes (Xn)n≥1 are tight; second, by smoothing properties of keat
kernels, the functions (un)n≥1 are locally uniformly continuous, see [9]. Extracting a conver-
gent subsequence, we can pass to the limit by using stability of forward-backward stochastic
differential equations.
Here is another straightforward refinement: when G is bounded, and F is bounded with
respect to all the parameters but y, and has a linear growth with respect to y, the solvability
still holds. Indeed, a standard maximum principle for BSDEs says that the process Y is
bounded, the bound depending upon the bound of G and the growth of F only, so that F
may be seen as a bounded driver.
6.2 Solvability of the MFG Adjoint Equations
In the MFG framework, the FBSDE system is given by (19). With the notation (70), it reads
B
(
t,Xt, Yt,L(Xt, Yt)
)
= b
(
t,Xt,L(Xt), αˆL(Xt)(t,Xt, Yt)
)
,
F
(
t,Xt, Yt,L(Xt, Yt)
)
= ∂xH
L(Xt)(t,Xt, Yt, αˆL(Xt)(t,Xt, Yt)),
G
(
XT ,L(XT )
)
= ∂xg
(
XT ,L(XT )
)
,
where H and αˆ are given by (12) and (13). We emphasize that the dependence upon the
McKean–Vlasov interaction is limited to the law of Xt only and that the coefficients do
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not involve the law of Yt. When ∂xg is bounded and ∂xH is bounded with respect to all
the parameters but y, and is at most of linear growth in y, Theorem 6.1 applies directly,
provided that the coefficients are Lipschitz continuous with respect to x, y and µ, the Lipschitz
continuity with respect to µ being with respect to the Wasserstein distance. (See [3, Section
3] for the analytical counterpart of this result.) In particular, the minimizer αˆµt(t, x, y) must
be Lipschitz continuous as well. In the examples tackled below, the Hamiltonian is always
strictly convex in the variable α so that the regularity of the minimizer follows from the
implicit function theorem.
In practice, the cost functions g and H are expected to be of quadratic growth in x so
that ∂xg and ∂xH cannot be bounded. The main point is thus to allow F and G to grow
at most linearly in the statement of Theorem 6.1. The strategy developed in [6] consists in
approximating the cost functions of the MFG control problem by a sequence of cost functions
with bounded derivatives in x preserving the convexity of the Hamiltonian in (x, α). Here is
the solvability result obtained in [6]:
Theorem 6.2. Let us assume that
(i) The cost function f is Lipschitz continuous in the variables x, µ and α on any balls
of center 0 and radius R, that is on sets where x and α are bounded by R and the second-
order moment of µ is by bounded by R2, the Lipschitz constant being at most of linear growth
in R. Moreover, f is twice-continuously differentiable with respect to x and α, with uni-
formly bounded second-order derivatives (uniformly in (t, x, µ, α)). The partial derivative
∂αf(t, x, µ, 0) is uniformly bounded and the product x∂xf(t, 0, δx, 0) is always non-negative.
(Here, δx denotes the Dirac mass at point x.) Moreover, the function f is convex in (x, α)
for (t, µ) fixed in the sense that there exists a constant λ > 0 such that:
f(t, x′, µ, α′)− f(t, x, µ, α)− 〈(x′ − x, α′ − α),∇(x,α)f(x, µ, α)〉 ≥ λ|α′ − α|2;
(ii) The terminal cost g is Lipschitz continuous in the variables x and µ on any balls of
center 0 and radius R (in the same sense as f) and the Lipschitz constant is at most of linear
growth in R. Moreover, g is twice-continuously differentiable with respect to x, with uniformly
bounded second-order derivatives (uniformly in (x, µ)), g is convex in x when µ is fixed and
the product x∂xg(0, δx) is always non-negative;
(iii) b is affine in x and α in the sense that b(t, x, µ, α) = b0(t, µ) + b1(t)x+ b2(t)α where
b0, b1 and b2 are bounded and b0 is Lipschitz-continuous with respect to µ for the Wasserstein
distance.
Then, the adjoint equation (19) has at least one solution.
There are three types of assumptions in the statement of Theorem 6.2. First, by linearity
of b in (x, α) and by convexity of f in (x, α), the Hamiltonian H is convex in (x, α). It is
even strictly convex in α. Following (19), this says that the stochastic Pontryagin principle
applies in the MFG procedure. Second, Lipschitz properties say that the coefficients are
regular with respect to the parameters x, α and µ. Actually, by a careful inspection of (i) and
(ii), the reader might notice that nothing is said about the regularity of ∂xH and ∂xg in the
parameter µ, whereas F and G are asked to be Lipschitz continuous in µ in the statement
of Theorem 6.1. Indeed, as proven in [6], only the regularity of the cost functions with
respect to the parameter µ really matters within the framework of control theory. Third, the
sign conditions on x∂xf(t, 0, δx, 0) and x∂xg(t, 0, δx, 0) sound as mean-reverting assumptions
of a weak type: when approximating the coefficients by bounded ones, the sign conditions
guarantee that the expectations of the approximating solutions do not blow up.
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In comparison with Section 3, we emphasize that the mean-field linear-quadratic mod-
els investigated therein do not satisfy the boundedness condition required for b0 in (iii). In
the current setting, the boundedness condition ensures that the fixed point measures of the
approximating MFG problems are tight. In the linear-quadratic framework, the tightness
condition can be expressed differently, as the problem may be reformulated directly, by inves-
tigating the solvability of associated Riccati equations. Moreover, the current sign conditions
must be compared with the sign conditions in the statement of Theorem 3.1. In the framework
of Theorem 3.1, x∂xg(0, δx) = qqx
2 and x∂xf(t, 0, δx, 0) = mtmtx
2, so that the sign condition
in Theorem 6.2 hold if q, q ≥ 0 and m,m ≥ 0 respectively. Keep in mind that we can always
assume q ≥ 0 and m ≥ 0. Clearly, this is stronger than the sign conditions q(q + q) ≥ 0 and
inft∈[0,T ][mt(mt +mt)] ≥ 0 required in Theorem 3.1.
Sketch of Proof (Theorem 6.2). As already announced, the proof consists in approximating
f and g by two sequences (fn)n≥1 and (gn)n≥1 satisfying the same assumptions, but with
bounded derivatives in x. The construction of the approximating sequence follows from
arguments of convex analysis, which may be found in [6]. We use the convexity of f and g to
express f and g as their own Legendre bi-conjugates and then truncate the dual variable in
the Legendre representation.
By Theorem 6.1, we then expect3 to find, for each n ≥ 1, a solution (Xn, Y n) to the
adjoint equations associated with the approximate Hamiltonian
Hn,µ(t, x, y, α) = b(t, x, µ, α)y + fn(t, x, µ, α), t ∈ [0, T ], x, y, α ∈ R, µ ∈ P1(R),
and therefore with the coefficients Bn(t, x, y, µ) = b(t, x, µ, αˆn(t, x, y, µ)), Fn(t, x, y, µ) =
∂xf
n(t, x, µ, αˆn(t, x, y, µ)) + b1(t)y and G
n(x, µ) = ∂xg
n(x, µ), where
αˆn(t, x, y, µ) = argminα∈RH
n,µ(t, x, y, α).
We also expect αˆn(t, x, y, µ) to converge towards αˆ(t, x, y, µ) as n→ +∞.
For n ≥ 1, we denote by Xn the process controlled by (αˆnt = αˆn(t,Xnt , Y nt ,L(Xnt )))0≤t≤T
and by un the FBSDE value function such that Y nt = u
n(t,Xnt ), for any t ∈ [0, T ]. Our goal
is to establish tightness of the processes (Xn)n≥1 and relative compactness of the functions
(un)n≥1 for the topology of uniform convergence on compact subsets of [0, T ]× R. The first
step is to prove that
sup
n≥1
E
[∫ T
0
|αˆns |2ds
]
< +∞, (74)
and the second step is to prove that the growth of the functions (un)n≥1 can be controlled,
uniformly in n ≥ 1.
In order to prove (74), we take advantage of the Hamiltonian structure of the coefficients
by comparing the behavior of Xn to the behavior of a reference controlled process, driven by
specific values of the control. Below, the generic notations for the reference controlled process
and for the reference control are Un and βn respectively. Two different versions are considered
for Un: they are driven by the controls βn ≡ 0 and (βns = E(αˆns ))0≤s≤T , respectively. For
each of these controls, we compare the corresponding cost to the optimal one by using the
stochastic Pontryagin principle and, subsequently, to derive some information on the optimal
control (αˆns )0≤s≤T . The starting point is to compare the behavior of X
n to the behavior of
3We say “expect” only since we said nothing about the smoothness of ∂xH and ∂xg with respect to µ. We
refer to [6] for the complete argument.
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the process Un controlled by the deterministic control (βns = E(αˆns ))0≤s≤T . As explained
right below, the goal is to obtain a uniform bound for the L2-norm in time of the variance of
(αˆns )0≤s≤T . Indeed, because of the specific affine structure of b in (iii), it can be checked that
E(Uns ) = E(Xns ), for 0 ≤ s ≤ T , and that supn≥1 sup0≤s≤T Var(Uns ) < +∞. By the stochastic
Pontryagin principle and by the growth and convexity properties in (i)–(iii), we then claim
gn
(
E(XnT ),L(XnT )
)
+
∫ T
t
[
λVar(αˆns ) + f
n
(
s,E(Xns ),L(Xns ),E(αˆns )
)]
ds
≤ E
[
gn
(
UnT ,L(XnT )
)
+
∫ T
t
fn
(
s, Uns ,L(Xns ), 0
)
ds
]
,
from which we can derive (see [6])
sup
n≥1
[∫ T
0
Var(αˆns )ds+ sup
0≤s≤T
Var(Xns )
]
≤ c
(
1 + E
∫ T
0
|αˆns |2ds
)1/2
. (75)
Bound (75) says that (74) holds if the expectations of the variables (Xnt )0≤t≤T are bounded.
In other words, we can only focus on the expectations of the variables (Xnt )0≤t≤T .
The second step in the proof of (74) consists in comparing the behavior of Xn to the
behavior of the process controlled by the null control. Since no confusion is possible, we still
denote by Un the process controlled by the null control βn ≡ 0. By boundedness of b0 in (iii),
it is easily checked that supn≥1 E[sup0≤s≤T |Uns |2] < +∞. Applying the stochastic Pontryagin
principle again together with Jensen’s inequality,
gn
(
E(XnT ),L(XnT )
)
+
∫ T
t
[
λE
(|αˆns |2)+ fn(s,E(Xns ),L(Xns ),E(αˆns ))]ds
≤ E
[
gn
(
UnT ,L(XnT )
)
+
∫ T
t
fn
(
s, Uns ,L(Xns ), 0
)
ds
]
.
(76)
The main point in [6] is to deduce that
E(XnT )∂xgn
(
0, δE(XnT )
)
+
∫ T
t
[λ
4
E
(|αˆns |2)+ E(Xns )∂xfn(s, 0, δE(Xns ), 0)]ds ≤ c.
By the sign property in (i) and (ii), (74) follows. We deduce that E[sup0≤s≤T |Xns |2] < +∞.
We also deduce that the processes (Xn)n≥1 are tight.
Once we have a uniform estimate for the moments of the (Xn)n≥1, we are led back to
FBSDEs of the standard Markovian type, each of them appearing as the adjoint system of a
standard optimal stochastic control problem. Standard FBSDE arguments then imply that
|un(t, x)| ≤ c(1 + |x|). Uniform continuity of the family (un)n≥1 on compact subsets follows
from the smoothing effect of heat kernels, see [9].
Let (u, µ) be the limit of a convergent subsequence which we still denote (un,L(Xn))n≥1.
The smoothing effect of heat kernels can also be used to prove that the functions (un)n≥1 are
uniformly locally Lipschitz-continuous in space, so that u itself is locally Lipschitz-continuous
in space. Since u grows at most linearly, the SDE
dXt = B
(
t,Xt, u(t,Xt), µt
)
dt+ σdWt,
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is strongly solvable. We can also solve the backward equation
dYt = −F
(
t,Xt, Yt, µt
)
dt+ ZtdWt, YT = G(XT , µT ).
By stability of forward and backward equations separately, it is plain to see that X is the
limit of the (Xn)n≥1 and that Y is the limit of the ((un(t,Xnt ))0≤t≤T )n≥1. Passing to the limit
in the approximating forward-backward systems, we conclude that (X,Y ) solves the adjoint
equation in (19).
6.3 Solvability of the adjoint Equations of the MKV Control Problem
In the framework of the optimal control of MKV processes, the forward-backward system
is given by (24). As for the MFG approach, it can be recast as a system of the type (70),
the coefficients of the backward component depending on the law of Y through the term
E{∂x′b(t,Xt,E{ψ(Xt)}, αt)Yt}∂xψ(Xt). We claim:
Theorem 6.3. In the framework of Theorem 2.1, assume that γ and ζ are twice-differentiable
convex functions, with bounded second-order derivatives and that b, f and g are twice-differen-
-tiable functions with bounded second-order derivatives that satisfy (A1) - (A3). Assume in
addition that b is linear with respect to x, x′ and α, namely b(t, x, x′, α) = b0(t) + b1(t)x +
b2(t)x
′ + b3(t)α, where b0, b1, b2 and b3 are bounded functions. Assume furthermore that
ψ(ξ) = ξ so that 〈ψ, µ〉 stands for the expectation of µ. Assume finally that f is λ-convex
with respect to α, for some λ > 0, so that H in (27) is also λ-convex with respect to α.
Then, the forward-backward system (24), with αt = αˆ(t,Xt, Yt,L(Xt)), is uniquely solv-
able, where αˆ(t, x, y, µ) = argminαH(t, x, 〈ψ, µ〉, 〈γ, µ〉, y, α).
Sketch of Proof. We first notice that the function αˆ is well-defined and Lipschitz-continuous
w.r.t to x, y and µ. As in the proof of Theorem 6.2, we consider sequences of convex functions
(fn)n≥1, (gn)n≥1, (γn)n≥1 and (ζn)n≥1, with bounded first and second-order derivatives, that
converge towards f , g, γ and ζ respectively. As explained in [5], we can choose (fn)n≥1,
(gn)n≥1, (γn)n≥1 and (ζn)n≥1 to be non-decreasing sequences. For each n ≥ 1, we define the
Hamiltonian Hn by replacing f by fn in (27), and we consider the forward-backward system
(24) by replacing (f, g, γ, ζ) therein by (fn, gn, γn, ζn) and αt by αˆ
n
t = αˆ
n(t,Xt, Yt,L(Xt)), the
argument of the minimum of Hn(t, x, 〈ψ, µ〉, 〈γ, µ〉, y, α): it is the forward-backward system
associated with the Hamiltonian Hn. We denote by (Xn, Y n) its solution.
By the stochastic Pontryagin principle, the process (αˆnt )0≤t≤T minimizes the cost function
(21), with f , g, γ and ζ therein replaced by fn, gn, γn and ζn. In particular, Jn(αˆn) ≤
Jn(αˆn+p), for p ≥ 0. Actually, by λ-convexity of fn with respect to α, we can even write, as
a variant of the stochastic Pontryagin principle,
Jn
(
αˆn
)
+ λE
∫ T
0
|αˆns − αˆn+ps |2ds ≤ Jn
(
αˆn+p
)
.
Since the sequences (fn)n≥1 and (gn)n≥1 are non-decreasing, we deduce that, for any admis-
sible control β, Jn(β) ≤ Jn+p(β). Therefore,
Jn
(
αˆn
)
+ λE
∫ T
0
|αˆns − αˆn+ps |2ds ≤ Jn+p
(
αˆn+p
)
.
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In particular, the sequence (Jn(αˆn))n≥1 is non-decreasing. Thus, it has a limit since it is
bounded by supn≥1(Jn(0)) <∞. We deduce that (αˆn)n≥1 is a Cauchy sequence. By stability
of standard McKean Vlasov SDEs, we deduce that that
lim
n→+∞ supp≥1
E
[
sup
0≤s≤T
|Xn+ps −Xns |2
]
= 0.
This proves that the processes (Xn)n≥1 converge for the norm E[sup0≤s≤T | · |2]1/2, towards a
continuous adapted process X. By standard results of stability for BSDEs, we then deduce
that the same holds for the processes (Y n)n≥1, that is
lim
n→+∞ supp≥1
E
[
sup
0≤s≤T
|Y n+ps − Y ns |2
]
= 0.
One then deduce the existence of the limit Y , and the fact that (X,Y ) satisfies the forward-
backward system (24). Uniqueness easily follows from the stochastic Pontryagin principle.
Remark 7. Uniqueness in Theorem 6.3 says that, for any t ∈ [0, T ], Yt is a function of
Xt and of the law of Xt, as in (72). This also follows from a standard change of filtration,
as usually done in the theory of BSDEs. In particular, the optimal control αˆ is a feedback
control, as expected.
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